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Abstract 
 
This paper studies the relationship between land rights and agricultural productivity. 
Whereas previous studies used proxies for soil quality and instrumental variables to 
control for the endogeneity of land titles, the data used here include precise soil quality 
measurements, which in principle allow controlling for the unobserved heterogeneity 
between plots. Empirical results suggest that formal land rights (i.e., land titles) have no 
impact on productivity, but that informal land rights (i.e., landowners’ subjective 
perceptions of what they can and cannot do with their plots) have heterogeneous impacts 
on productivity. 
 
Keywords: Institutions, Property Rights, Land Rights, Land, Productivity 
JEL Classification Codes: K11, O12, O13, Q15 
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1. Introduction 
In his best-selling book The Mystery of Capital, de Soto (2000) claims that the poor in 
developing countries own about US$1 trillion worth of assets − a figure roughly comparable to 
the 2010 gross domestic product of South Korea − but that it is often the case that the lack of 
well-defined property rights in the same developing countries prevents the poor from capitalizing 
on those assets. 
 
Leaving aside the assumptions de Soto makes about the value of those assets and the efficacy of 
the legal system in most developing countries (Woodruff 2001), empirical studies by Acemoglu 
et al. (2001, 2005) and Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) have shown that institutions – property 
rights institutions in particular – have not only had long-term impacts on comparative economic 
development, but they are also the main cause of differences in economic performance between 
countries. 
 
Within countries, more specifically in developing-country agriculture, economists have theorized 
since the works of Feder and Noronha (1987), Feder and Feeny (1991), and Migot-Adholla et al. 
(1991) that there are three causal mechanisms through which well-defined property rights can 
increase agricultural productivity (and thus the welfare of landowners) within an effective legal 
system. First, property rights allow landowners to lease out or sell their plots of land to more 
productive individuals. Second, property rights give landowners stronger incentives to maintain 
and improve their plots. Third, property rights allow landowners to use their plots as collateral to 
obtain loans that can be used to finance investments in land or the purchase of production inputs. 
In other words, clearly defined land rights should lead to productivity gains, all else being equal.1 
 
As a result, land reform has been part and parcel of the development Zeitgeist for some time, 
although the empirical evidence on the impact of land tenure on productivity is, at best, mixed 
(Place 2009). In several countries, a land title is often worth no more than the paper it is printed 
on, either because the state has failed to broadcast its power to remote rural areas (Herbst 2000) 
or because the transaction costs involved in defending one’s claim to a plot of land through the 
legal system are exceedingly high (Fafchamps and Minten, 2001). 
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This paper looks at the effect of land rights in Madagascar by looking at whether formal land 
rights (whether a plot is titled) and informal land rights (whether the landowner believes she can 
lease the plot out, sell it, plant trees on it, build a tomb on it, and by whether she believes her 
children will have the same rights as herself on the plot) have any impact on agricultural 
productivity. In this paper, “informal land rights” thus refer to the landowner’s subjective beliefs 
regarding whether she can do specific things on or with her plot of land.2 
 
In this context, knowing the productivity impacts of land rights is crucial for policy. In April 
2005, the Millennium Challenge Corporation signed a $110 million, four-year compact with the 
government of Madagascar – more than 2 percent of Madagascar’s gross domestic product that 
year – which included an important land tenure component, and whose goal was to “increase 
land titling and land security” (Millennium Challenge Corporation 2010). But this raises the 
question of whether land titles have a discernable impact on agricultural productivity in 
Madagascar. One of the goals of this paper is thus to show whether these titles actually improve 
agricultural productivity. 
 
Although the impact of land rights has previously been studied in Madagascar (Jacoby and 
Minten 2007), the data used in this paper allow building upon previous results so as to 
potentially go one step further as far as the identification of the impact of land rights on 
agricultural productivity goes. The data include several plots per household, which in principle 
allows controlling for the unobserved heterogeneity between households.3 More importantly, 
even though there already are several studies on the impacts of land rights on agricultural 
investment or productivity or both, the data used in this paper include precise soil quality 
measurements (i.e., carbon, nitrogen, and potassium percentages; soil pH; and clay, silt, and sand 
content) for each plot, which allows one to effectively control for the unobserved heterogeneity 
between plots instead of having to rely on proxies for soil quality. Such soil quality controls have 
so far been missing from the literature on the productivity impacts of land rights in developing 
countries.4  
 
An empirical specification of the agricultural productivity equation lies at the core of this paper 
which includes both formal and informal land rights as well as the plot characteristics that are 
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both readily observable (e.g., soil color; position on the toposequence; source of irrigation, etc.) 
and those that are typically unobservable (e.g., soil carbon, nitrogen, and potassium content; soil 
pH; clay, silt, and sand percentages) as potential determinants of agricultural productivity.5 The 
main finding is that land titles appear to have no statistically significant impact on agricultural 
productivity in this context. This finding is robust to the various alternative specifications 
presented in this paper. In contrast, some informal land rights are significantly associated with 
changes in agricultural productivity, but in puzzling ways: the right to lease the plot out and the 
right to build a tomb on it are associated with a decline in productivity, whereas the right to plant 
trees is associated with an increase in productivity. The hypothesized mechanisms through which 
these informal land rights affect productivity are discussed below.  
 
By including soil quality controls, this paper improves upon the usual strategy aimed at 
identifying the impact of land rights by controlling for the (typically) unobserved heterogeneity 
between plots that has plagued previous studies (Besley 1995; Brasselle et al. 2002). Indeed, the 
inclusion of soil quality measurements as a determinant of agricultural productivity has the 
potential to purge the error term of its correlation with whether a plot is titled. In other words, 
because individuals may seek to title higher quality plots (Besley 1995), the inclusion of soil 
quality measurements reduces the bias of the estimated effect of land titles. 
 
The contribution of this paper to the literature on land rights is thus threefold. First and foremost, 
the inclusion of precise soil quality measurements allows accounting for an important source of 
unobserved heterogeneity between plots, which in turn allows eliminating an important source of 
bias in the estimated relationship between land titles and agricultural productivity – a source of 
bias that is present in almost all observational studies of the impacts of land rights. Second, the 
core finding in this paper – that land titles do not increase productivity in this context – flies in 
the face of the dominant development discourse, which almost takes the claim that land titles 
improve productivity as a truism. Third, this paper studies the impact of informal land rights (i.e., 
subjective landowner perceptions regarding what they can and cannot do with their plots) 
alongside formal land rights (i.e., land titles) and shows that these informal land rights have 
heterogeneous, sometimes unexpected impacts on productivity. Taken together then, the 
inclusion of household fixed effects, precise soil quality measurements, as well as formal and 
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informal land rights paint a picture of productivity impacts of land rights that is as complete as 
possible in the absence of data derived from an experiment specifically aimed at studying the 
impact of land rights on productivity. 
 
2. Land Titles, Land Rights, and Land Tenure Institutions in Madagascar 
The state of land tenure institutions in Madagascar is best described by the Lettre de politique 
foncière, a document summarizing the proceedings of a workshop on land tenure organized by 
the Ministry of Agriculture in early 2005.6 The Lettre de politique foncière stemmed directly 
from the objectives delineated in Madagascar’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper and was 
written in order to describe the situation and clearly define priorities for policy makers. 
 
The Lettre de politique foncière describes how customary rights have gradually receded since 
Malagasy independence in 1960 as land has increasingly become a traded asset. As a result, 
landowners have been increasingly turning to the state to define their property rights. Because 
untitled and uncultivated lands officially belong to the state, half a million requests to obtain 
government lands are pending (Bertrand et al. 2008). Land titling, however, has been and is still 
proceeding at a snail’s pace: a total of 330,000 titles have been delivered over the last century 
and, as of 2005, only about 1,000 new titles were delivered annually.7 Some requests for land 
titles have been pending for several decades (Teyssier et al. 2008), and as plots are passed on 
from one generation to the next and broken up into smaller plots through bequests, formal land 
titles fall into obsolescence due to the prohibitive costs of keeping them up to date. Moreover, 
according to Teyssier et al. (2007), titling a plot of land can take up to 10 years and cost about 
US$900 once one accounts for bribes and other “unofficial” costs. In a country where the GDP 
per capita in 2010 was equal to $415 (IMF 2011), this represents a substantial amount of money. 
 
In addition, the central government agency in charge of land tenure is overwhelmed. The 
buildings in which titling records are held are often in an advanced state of decay, which makes 
record-keeping a heroic endeavor as some records have already been irreversibly damaged. The 
government employees in charge of the administration of lands face difficult working conditions 
and often have to bring their own materials to work. The Lettre de politique foncière concludes 
that the land titling system is bankrupt and that many landowners feel insecure on their own 
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lands. Furthermore, land conflicts occur frequently, acquiring a land title is practically 
impossible without bribing the relevant authority figures, and landowners appear to have little to 
no incentive to invest in their own plots (Dabat and Razafindraibe 2008). 
 
Among the causes identified by the Lettre de politique foncière for this situation are (i) a lack of 
legal knowledge among landowners; (ii) the complexity, length of time, and costliness of the 
procedure leading up to the acquisition of a land title (Teyssier et al. 2008); (iii) the lack of funds 
allocated to the management of lands at the local level; (iv) the centralization of land 
administration; and (v) the lack of intermediaries between the central government and 
smallholders. 
 
Small landowners have adapted to the situation. Many rural communities have chosen to opt out 
of the legal system (Bernstein 1992) by putting in place their own informal system of land titles, 
called petits papiers (“small papers”; see Jacoby and Minten 2007 for a discussion). Under this 
system, which has burgeoned all over the country even in the absence of a coordinated effort, 
informal land titles are officialized at the community level, and many land sales are accompanied 
by a petit papier. Because they are informal, however, these petits papiers are only valid within 
the community and do not protect landowners against the possibility of adverse possession from 
outside the community (Baker et al. 2001).8 
 
As a consequence of the Lettre de politique foncière, important efforts have been made since 
2005 to reform land tenure institutions in Madagascar. Generally speaking, the objective of these 
reforms has been a greater recognition of untitled private property. In 2005, the management of 
lands was decentralized at the commune level and the ownership of untitled private property was 
legally recognized (Republic of Madagascar 2005). In 2006, a law and subsequent government 
decree have allowed communes to open a guichet foncier (land tenure office) where landowners 
could get certificates documenting their property rights on their plots, and where an official map 
of the lands in the commune would be kept (Republic of Madagascar 2006). Further efforts have 
been made to map out and classify public lands as well as define rights on these lands (Republic 
of Madagascar 2008a; 2008b). As of writing this paper, even though the coup d’état of March 
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2009 has caused a decline in the amount of available funds available for land tenure via a sharp 
drop in foreign aid, the reform continues to move forward (Programme national foncier 2011). 
 
3. Empirical Framework 
The contribution of this paper lies in the way the impacts of land rights is identified, so this 
section focuses on the equations to be estimated as well as the identification strategy used to 
establish the causal impact of formal land rights on agricultural productivity. 
  
3.1. Estimation Strategy 
While similar studies usually focus on the impact of property rights on investment in land, the 
data used here do not include information on long-term investments (e.g., tree planting, as in 
Deininger and Jin 2003 or Dercon and Ayalew 2007). Although the data include information on 
five different kinds of short-term investments, these investments were made in too few cases to 
allow using them as outcomes. Landowners reported having applied manure on their plots in 21 
percent of cases; urea in less than 1 percent of cases; NPK and pesticides in 3 percent of cases; 
and having treated their seeds in a little over 1 percent of cases. Consequently, and because land 
rights should in principle have unambiguously positive effects on agricultural productivity, this 
paper relies on a reduced-form approach by directly looking at the impact of property rights on 
agricultural productivity rather than looking at the intermediate impact of property rights on 
investment. 
 
The first specification of the agricultural productivity equation is a “kitchen-sink” specification 
that includes measures of both formal and informal land rights as well as soil quality 
measurements. Because the rights captured by the informal measures of property rights are in 
principle included among the bundle of rights that come with formal rights (i.e., land titles), 
controlling for informal land rights in addition to formal land rights may understate the impact of 
formal land rights on productivity. Likewise, investments in soil quality could be a mechanism 
through which formal land rights affect agricultural productivity, so that controlling for soil 
quality measurements in addition to controlling for formal land rights may understate the impact 
of formal land rights on productivity.  
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To account for these two possibilities, the results of three additional specifications of the 
agricultural productivity equation are presented: (i) a specification which excludes both informal 
land rights and soil quality measurements; (ii) a specification which includes soil quality 
measurements but excludes informal land rights; and (iii) a specification which includes informal 
land rights but excludes soil quality measurements. A fourth specification, which excludes 
formal land rights but includes both informal land rights with and without soil quality 
measurements is also included so as to assess the impacts of informal land rights and offer a 
complete set of results. Various statistical tests – a test of joint significance of the household 
fixed effects, a Hausman test of exogeneity of the land title variable, and a test of joint 
significance of the soil quality measurements – are ultimately conducted in order to determine 
which set of results should be preferred. 
 
The first specification to be estimated in this paper is such that 
 
 ln  =  +  +  +  + 	 ln 
 + .    (1) 
 
On the left-hand side of equation 1,  represents the yield (i.e., output per unit of land) on plot i 
belonging to household j in village k. Because rice is the staple crop in Madagascar, data 
collection focused on rice agriculture, and so this paper focuses only on rice productivity. On the 
right-hand side of equation 1,  is a dummy variable equal to one if the plot is titled and equal to 
zero otherwise, i.e., a measure of formal land rights;  is a vector of dummy variables for 
whether the landowner believes she can sell the plot, lease it out, plant trees, or build a tomb, and 
for whether her children will have similar rights on the plot, i.e., measures of informal land 
rights;  is a vector of plot characteristics (i.e., cultivated area; whether the plot suffered from 
crop disease; distance from the landowner’s dwelling; soil color; position on the toposequence; 
and source of irrigation); 
 is a vector of soil quality measurements (i.e., carbon, nitrogen, and 
potassium contents; soil pH; and clay, silt, and sand contents); and  is an error term with mean 
zero. In what follows, the specification in equation 1 will be referred to as the ordinary least 
squares (OLS) specification. 
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The specification in equation 1 unrealistically assumes that the error term is uncorrelated with 
any of the variables on the right-hand side of equation 1. As economists have long recognized, it 
is likely that more productive plots are more likely to be titled (Besley 1995; Brasselle et al. 
2002). To account for this possibility, the dummy variable  for whether the plot is titled is 
replaced by its predicted value from a first-stage instrumenting regression in the second 
specification to be estimated in this paper, such that 
 
 ln  =  + ̂ +  +  + 	 ln 
 + ,   (2) 
 
where ̂ is the predicted value of  obtained from the first-stage instrumenting regression in 
which  is regressed on , , 
, and on a dummy variable equal to one if the plot was inherited or 
given to the landowner and equal to zero if it was purchased or cleared by the landowner (see 
section 3.1 for a discussion of this latter variable’s validity as an instrument in this context). In 
what follows, the specification in equation 2 will be referred to as the instrumental variables (IV) 
specification, and the validity of the IV used will be discussed in section 3.1 below. 
 
In both equations 1 and 2, it is likely that the error term includes unobserved household 
characteristics that are correlated with the variables included on the right-hand side. To account 
for this possibility, and because the data include several households who own more than one 
plot, the third specification includes household fixed effects, such that 
 
 ln  =  +  +  +  + 	 ln 
 +  + ,  (3) 
 
where 	is a vector of household fixed effects.9 In what follows, the specification in equation 3 
will be referred to as the fixed effects (FE) specification. 
 
Lastly, the specifications in equations 2 and 3 are combined into a fixed effects instrumental 
variables (FE-IV) specification, such that 
 
ln  =  + ̂ +  +  + 	 ln 
 +  + .  (4) 
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The instrumental variable used in equation 4 is the same as in equation 2, and section 3.1 
discusses the IV, along with other identification considerations.  
 
Because equations 1 to 4 present a kitchen-sink approach (i.e., they include all the available 
explanatory variables), which may understate the causal impact of formal land rights, section 3.2 
discusses variants of equations 1 to 4 aimed at disentangling the reduced-form causal impacts of 
formal land rights from the mechanisms through which formal land rights may increase 
agricultural productivity (Pearl 2009). 
 
3.2. Identification Strategy 
In order to discuss the identification of causal impacts, it is helpful to start with a description of 
what the ideal data set would look like to serve as a benchmark against which to compare the 
data used in this paper. 
 
Short of a randomized control trial in which the treatment would consist in titling randomly 
selected plots and would test whether productivity is higher in the treatment group than in the 
control group (see Duflo et al. 2008 for a general exposition of the method and Barrett and Carter 
2010 for a discussion of its limitations), the ideal data set in this context would include repeated 
observations on the plots belonging to households across several villages.  
 
In terms of variables, that ideal data set would include time-varying plot-level information on 
production (i.e.,  above), soil quality (i.e., 
), and the characteristics of the plot (i.e., ) within 
each household, and it would also include time-varying information on formal land rights (i.e., 
titling status, or ) and informal land rights (i.e., ) within a significant number of households. 
Using that ideal data set, it would be possible to study the dynamic effects of land rights on 
agricultural productivity while controlling for unobserved heterogeneity between plots, 
households, and villages. 
 
Compared to that idealized benchmark, the data used in this paper are cross-sectional, and so 
they do not allow studying the dynamic relationship between land rights and agricultural 
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productivity. Even if such a data set were available, it is unlikely that there would be much 
variation within each household in formal land rights over time (especially in a context in which 
the government emits less than 1,500 new titles annually). It is even more unlikely that there 
would be much variation in informal land rights within each household over time, since beliefs 
about what one can and cannot do on or with one’s plots take a long time to form and are 
unlikely to change much once they are formed. 
 
How is the impact of land rights on agricultural productivity identified? Both productivity and 
land rights vary between plots within each household, so absent any correlation between the 
regressors and the error term, the coefficient vector (, ) in equation 1 measures the impact of 
land rights on productivity. It is usually not the case, however, that the regressors and the error 
term are uncorrelated. Following Besley (1995), the plots in a given village could be more likely 
titled than in other villages. For example, the institutions in a given village could be such that a 
land title would bring nothing more than what the village elders can grant a landowner. Or it 
could be that the landowners who seek titles differ in systematic ways from those who do not. 
For example, they could be wealthier, more educated, have a better knowledge of the legal 
system, and so on. In such cases, the inclusion of household fixed effects (as in equation 3) 
allows controlling for the endogeneity of land titles.10 
 
It could also be, however, that the plots whose landowners seek titles differ systematically from 
those whose landowners do not. For instance, they could have better irrigation, lower carbon 
content, a more acidic soil, and so on. In this case, the best one can do is to include as many 
controls as possible. In this paper, these controls include a vector of soil quality measurements; 
the size of the area cultivated on the plot; a dummy variable for whether the plot suffered from a 
crop disease during the last season; the distance between the landowner’s dwelling and the plot; 
controls for the color of the soil; controls for the plot’s position on the toposequence; and 
controls for the plot’s source of irrigation. 
 
The inclusion of both household fixed effects and soil quality measurements in principle allows 
identifying the causal impact of land rights on productivity, but this paper also presents the 
results of instrumental variable specifications (i.e., equations 2 and 4), both for comparability 
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with previous studies (Besley 1995; Brasselle et al. 2002) and to tease out the reduced-form 
causal impacts of land titles from the mechanisms through which land titles increase 
productivity, as discussed in the next section.  
 
As discussed above, the empirical strategy used by Besley (1995) and Brasselle et al. (2002) is 
adapted to this context, and the dummy for whether the plot is formally titled is instrumented 
with a dummy variable equal to one if the plot was inherited or given to the landowner and equal 
to zero if it was purchased or cleared by the landowner. The identifying assumption is that the 
way in which a plot came to be owned by an individual landowner should have no impact on a 
plot’s productivity (except through the presence of a formal title), given the plot-level controls 
included in equation 2, but it has an impact on whether the landowner seeks a title.  
 
On the one hand, even if a plot’s mode of acquisition impacts soil quality, this is controlled for 
by the inclusion of soil quality measurements and other observable plot characteristics in the 
productivity equation. On the other hand, the longer a plot has been owned by the landowner’s 
family, the more likely it is to be accompanied by a title that is in principle easily transferable to 
the landowner relative to plots that have been purchased from strangers or cleared by the 
landowner. Because the most convincing instrumental variables involve some form of 
randomization so as to introduce a plausibly exogenous variation with which to identify a causal 
impact, the instrumental variable used here is far from ideal. Again, it is included here to make 
the results comparable with those of previous studies. 
 
Lastly, although it is possible that the landowner’s subjective perceptions of informal land rights 
 are also endogenous to agricultural productivity, the data unfortunately do not include valid 
instruments for those variables, so specifications with and without informal land rights are 
presented so as to gauge the sensitivity of the impact of formal land rights (i.e., land titles) on 
agricultural productivity to their presence among the set of covariates. Consequently, the reader 
should be careful not to interpret the estimated coefficients for those informal land rights as 
causal. 
 
3.3. Reduced-Form Causal Impacts versus Mechanisms 
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The kitchen-sink specification of the agricultural productivity equation in equations 1 to 4 may 
suffer from significant shortcomings if one is interested in the causal impact of specific treatment 
variables.  
 
Indeed, following economic theory, it is likely that one of the mechanisms through which formal 
and informal land rights increase agricultural productivity is investment in soil quality (Feder 
and Noronha 1987; Feder and Feeny 1991; and Migot-Adholla et al. 1991). For example, a 
landowner may be more likely to apply fertilizer on a titled plot than on an untitled plot, simply 
because she is likely to reap the fruits of her investment for a longer period of time on the titled 
plot since it is less likely to be taken from her than the untitled plot, everything else equal.11 In 
that case, controlling for both land rights and soil quality measurements could lead to 
underestimating the causal impact of land rights.  
 
Likewise, the inclusion of informal land rights alongside formal land rights can lead to 
underestimating the causal impact of formal land rights. In the context of an effective legal 
system, a land title would give a landowner a bundle of rights which includes among other things 
the rights to sell the plot, to lease it out, to plant trees on it, and to build a tomb on it, and which 
would guarantee that a landowner’s children would have the same rights to the plot as the 
landowner. If land titles truly increase productivity, controlling for informal land rights when 
also controlling for the presence of a formal land title will lead to underestimating the causal 
impact of formal land titles on agricultural productivity. One should keep in mind, however, that 
any new formal land titling program will be situated in places where informal land rights such as 
those studied here already exist. Consequently, formal titles will rarely create rights that are not 
at least partly observed in practice. 
 
Still, to account for these two possibilities, three additional versions of the agricultural 
productivity equations 1 to 4 are presented: (i) a version that excludes both informal land rights 
and soil quality measurements so as to focus purely on formal land rights; (ii) a version that 
includes soil quality measurements but excludes informal land rights; and (iii) a specification 
that includes informal land rights but excludes soil quality measurements. Lastly, a version that 
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excludes formal land rights but includes informal land rights both with and without soil quality 
measurements is also included so as to offer the most complete and robust set of results possible. 
 
4. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The data used in this paper were collected in 2002 under the US Agency for International 
Development’s BASIS Collaborative Research Support Program. A total of 516 plots belonging 
to 300 randomly selected households in 17 randomly selected villages were surveyed in the 
central highlands of Madagascar. Because rice is the staple crop in Madagascar, the survey 
focused on rice agriculture. Because of missing values, and to concentrate on the plots for which 
output has been strictly positive, the analysis retains a total of 473 plots belonging to 290 
households for analysis. 
 
The average household in the sample owned 1.6 plots, so a significant number of the households 
in the data (i.e., 169 households out of 290) owned only one plot. Because of the sampling 
scheme, standard errors are clustered at the village level unless otherwise noted. 
 
The unique feature of the data is that five soil cores were extracted in random locations from 
each selected plot of a sub-sample of rice plots and sent to the World Agroforestry Centre in 
Nairobi for wet chemistry and spectral analysis. In total, sample soil cores were extracted from 
rice plots belonging to 300 households. All the soil cores underwent spectral analysis, but 
because wet chemistry is both costly and destructive, a sub-sample of 234 soil cores went 
through wet chemistry analysis, which allows precisely measuring a soil sample’s carbon, 
nitrogen, and potassium contents; its pH level; as well as its clay, silt, and sand percentages. The 
results of the wet chemistry analysis were then used as dependent variables in imputing 
regressions that relied on principal component scores derived from a spectral analysis of the full 
sample as their independent variables. This ultimately allowed imputing precise soil quality 
measurements for the entire sample of plots. Appendix table A1 shows that the adjusted  
measures were above 0.85 in five of the seven imputing regressions. See Shepherd and Walsh 
(2002) for a validation of this method, and Barrett et al. (2010) for a description of the soil 
analysis protocol. Because the soil quality measurements are generated regressors, standard 
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errors are bootstrapped unless otherwise noted whenever soil quality measurements are included 
among the regressors.12 
 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the variables in this paper. The yield on the average 
plot was equal to 37 kilograms of rice per are,13 or 3.7 metric tons of rice per hectare, the 
production of which required on average 0.16 hectares of land. This rice was produced on plots 
which on average contained 2.4 percent carbon, 0.2 percent nitrogen, and 0.2 percent potassium; 
had a soil pH of about 5.1;14 and contained 28.2 percent clay, 26.4 percent silt, and 45.1 percent 
sand. 
 
Roughly one in five plots was stricken by crop disease during the last production season, and the 
average plot was located about ten minutes away on foot from the landowner’s house. The soil 
was predominantly black in 51 percent of cases, red in 18 percent of cases, and either brown or 
white in 31 percent of cases. The vast majority (62 percent) of plots are lowland rice plots while 
most of the remainder (38 percent) are hillside plots, with only very few plots (2 percent) located 
on hilltops. Finally, 45 percent of plots are irrigated by a dam, 37 percent are irrigated by a 
spring, and only 15 percent are irrigated by rainfall. 
 
As regards informal land rights, landowners report perceiving that they have the right to sell on 
56.4 percent of the plots; the right to build a tomb on 15.2 percent of the plots;15 the right to lease 
out on 72.3 percent of the plots; the right to plant trees on 51.6 percent of the plots; and they 
report perceiving that their children will have the same rights as themselves on 46 percent of the 
plots. Although respondents were given for each informal right question the opportunity to 
respond that they did not know whether they had that right along with the usual “yes” and “no” 
options, no respondent chose that answer for any of the informal rights.  
 
Almost a third (32.3 percent) of all plots in the sample are titled (i.e., this measures the 
proportion of landowners who answer the question “Is there a title for this plot?” in the 
affirmative),16 which is close to the national average of 28 percent.17 Moreover, almost two 
thirds (64.3 percent) of the plots were inherited, a little under a third (31.9 percent) were 
purchased, and few of them were either received as a gift (0.6 percent) or cleared by the 
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landowner (2.3 percent). The landowner intends to seek a title for almost half of the plots in the 
sub-sample of untitled plots and would be willing to pay about US$2.87 per are to do so,18 or 
about US$47 in total for the average plot. 
 
Before proceeding with the econometric analysis of the impact of land rights on productivity, it 
is instructive to simply look at the unconditional impact of land titles on various indicators. Table 
2 thus splits the sample along formal land rights – i.e., titled and untitled plots − and reports 
descriptive statistics for each informal land right, i.e., the right to sell, whether the landowner’s 
children will have the same rights on the plot, the right to build a tomb, the right to lease the plot 
out, and the right to plant trees. Table 2 further reports descriptive statistics by titling status for 
how the plot was acquired as well as for the soil quality measurements. 
 
Although one would expect owners of titled plots to have more informal land rights on their plot 
than owners of untitled plots, the results in the first part of table 2 indicate otherwise. Indeed, 
although the fact that a landowner’s children will have similar rights as herself on the plot is 
significantly more prevalent on titled plots, the right to sell and the right to build a tomb are both 
significantly more prevalent on untitled plots. Moreover, both inherited plots and the plots 
received as gifts are more likely to be titled, but purchased plots are more likely to be untitled. 
These results, while prima facie puzzling, are likely due to the fact that many land titles have not 
been kept up to date, and so they fail to effectively guarantee the rights of landowners.  
 
Titled plots differ systematically from untitled plots along almost every soil quality 
measurement. Titled plots have consistently higher soil carbon, nitrogen, and sand contents, but 
systematically lower potassium, and clay contents, and systematically lower levels of soil pH. 
This suggests that soil quality may play a role in the decision of landowners to seek a title for 
their plots, but also that investment in soil quality may be a mechanism through which land titles 
affect agricultural productivity, which makes the part of the analysis that attempts to separate 
reduced-form causal effects from mechanisms discussed in section 3.2 all the more relevant. 
Lastly, there is no significant difference in mean rice yield between titled and untitled plots. 
 
5. Estimation Results and Discussion 
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The comparisons just discussed between titled and untitled plots fail to control for confounding 
factors. This section addresses this problem by systematically studying the impact of formal and 
informal land rights on productivity. 
 
5.1. Estimating the Productivity Impacts of Land Rights: Kitchen-Sink Approach 
Table 3 presents estimation results for four specifications of the agricultural productivity 
equation: (i) OLS (equation 1); (ii) IV (equation 2); (iii) FE (equation 3); and (iv) FE-IV 
(equation 4). As discussed elsewhere (Barrett et al. 2010), there is a consistent inverse 
relationship between plot size and productivity in these data, as the results suggest that doubling 
the size of the average plot would lead to a decrease in yield of 21 percent (in the FE 
specification) to 35 percent (in the OLS specification). 
 
A plot’s position on the toposequence impacts productivity in that hillside plots are less 
productive at the margin than hilltop or lowland plots, but this is true only insofar as household 
fixed effects are omitted. This suggests that relatively less productive households cultivate 
hillside plots, and that once the unobserved heterogeneity between households is controlled for, a 
plot’s position on the toposequence no longer matters.  
 
The positive effects on productivity of structural irrigation (as opposed to irrigation by rainfall, 
the omitted category) are about the same whether a plot is irrigated by a dam or by a spring. This 
is true for all specifications, but the magnitude of the impact is considerably higher for 
specifications accounting for the unobserved heterogeneity between households. Again, this 
suggests that households that are less productive at the margin are the ones cultivating plots 
irrigated by a dam or spring instead of rainfall. 
 
Except for a plot’s potassium content or its pH, the soil quality measurements are, for the most 
part, statistically insignificant when considered individually. The soil quality measurements are 
jointly significant, however, in the IV, FE, and FE-IV specifications.19 In any event, the lack of 
statistical significance of individual soil quality measurements need not be a concern: in his 
comprehensive economic history of agriculture over the last two centuries, Federico (2005, page 
7) discusses how the most convincing studies of the impact of soil quality on productivity find 
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that only extreme values of soil pH really affect land productivity once other factors are 
controlled for. 
 
Turning to the variables of interest, formal land rights do not have the posited theoretical impact 
on productivity at the margin, as the coefficient on whether a plot is titled is never significant at 
any of the conventional levels in any of the specifications in table 3. 
  
Informal land rights matter in only a few cases. Whether a landowner believes she can lease out 
her plot is associated with increased productivity at the margin in the OLS specification, but with 
decreased productivity at the margin in the FE specification. Likewise, the right to build a tomb 
on the plot is also associated with decreases in productivity in both the FE and FE-IV 
specifications. The former effect is consistent with the literature associating land leases with a 
considerable amount of tenurial insecurity in Madagascar (Blanc-Pamard and Rakoto 
Ramiarantsoa 2000; Sandron 2008; Bellemare 2012). Both these results are discussed in more 
detail in section 5.2 below. Lastly, the right to plant trees is associated with increases in 
productivity in the FE specification. 
 
A comparison of the results in table 3 also indicates that, depending on the specification, 
different results obtain. Comparing the naïve OLS with the FE specification, which controls for 
the unobservable heterogeneity between households, while the sign of the coefficient capturing 
the impact of a land title remains unchanged, the size the coefficient is increased by about one 
order of magnitude. There exists a similar difference between the estimated impact of a land title 
in the OLS and IV specification, but the latter results will not be discussed given that the 
instrument is weak in this cross-sectional context: the Cragg-Donald test of the null hypothesis 
that the instrument is weak has an F-statistic equal to 2.61 (see Stock and Yogo 2002). The weak 
instrument problem is considerably lessened in the FE-IV specification, where the F-statistic on 
the instrument is very close to the weak-instrument threshold of 10, and which is perhaps the 
most credible of all four specifications in table 3. When comparing the FE-IV specification with 
the FE specification, although the estimated impact of a land title changes from negative to 
positive, the impact remains statistically insignificant at any of the conventional levels.  
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The results in table 3 suggest that in this context, formal land rights (i.e., land titles) have no 
impact on agricultural productivity but informal land rights (i.e., the landowner’s subjective 
perceptions with respect to specific rights on the plot) affect productivity in heterogeneous ways. 
Because the results in table 3 may understate the causal impacts of land rights, the next section 
presents estimation results aimed at separating the reduced-form causal impacts of land rights on 
agricultural productivity from the mechanisms through which land rights affect agricultural 
productivity. 
 
5.2. Reduced-Form Causal Effects vs. Mechanisms 
The results in table 3 often control for the causal mechanisms between the “treatment” variables 
of interest (i.e., the presence of formal or informal land rights) and the final outcome under study 
(i.e., agricultural productivity) while seeking to estimate the reduced‐form causal effect of these 
treatment variables. See section 3.3 for a discussion. To address these concerns, specifications 
were estimated without either soil quality measurements or measures of informal land rights; 
with soil quality measurements but without measures of informal land rights; and without soil 
quality measurements but with measures of informal land rights. A synthesis of the estimated 
effects of formal land rights on agricultural productivity is then presented in table 4, along with 
estimation results for the estimated effects of informal land rights that exclude a control for 
formal land rights, both with and without soil quality measurements in table 5.20 
 
Looking at the results in table 4, however, the overarching result is that although there are some 
changes in magnitude, the coefficient on the dummy variable for whether the plot is titled is 
never statistically significant at any of the conventional levels. 
 
The next step was to conduct (i) tests of joint significance of the household fixed effects, (ii) 
Hausman tests in order to determine whether the IV was necessary, and (iii) tests of joint 
significance for the soil quality measurements as well as for the informal land rights measures. 
The household fixed effects are everywhere jointly significantly different from zero in table 4, 
which indicates that one should focus on FE or FE-IV specifications. For the Hausman test of 
exogeneity of the land title dummy variable in the FE specifications in table 3, the (21) 
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statistic of the test was equal to 0.68, which translates into a p-value of 1.00, thus suggesting that 
one should focus on FE specifications. 
 
Looking into the FE specification in the third column of table 3, the (7) statistic for soil 
quality measurements was equal to 17.06 and the (5) statistic for informal land rights was 
11.04, which means one can reject the null hypotheses that (i) the soil quality measurements are 
jointly insignificant, and (ii) the informal land rights variables are jointly insignificant with 
respective p-values equal to 0.02 and 0.05. So if one were forced to pick a preferred 
specification, one should pick the specification in the third column of table 3, i.e., FE including 
informal land rights and soil quality measurements. 
 
Table 5 then presents results for the impacts of informal land rights on agricultural productivity 
excluding a control for whether the plot is titled, both with and without soil quality controls. 
Once again, this is because investments in soil quality may be a mechanism through which 
informal land rights affect productivity. Because the data did not include valid instruments for 
each and every informal land right included in table 5, the best one can do is focus on the FE 
estimation results. In this case, the inclusion of soil quality controls in the fourth column of table 
5 makes the landowner’s subjective perception of whether she can build a tomb on her plot 
statistically significant, with the end result that whether the presence of a formal title is 
controlled for, subjective perceptions of informal land rights end up having the same impacts on 
agricultural productivity. 
 
That the right to build a tomb on the plot decreases productivity suggests that specific taboos 
(Ruud 1960) or cultural mores (Graeber 1995) might play an important role in constraining 
productivity on the plots on which one can build a tomb.21 It may seem puzzling that the right to 
build a tomb would entail a loss of productivity given that there is no a priori reason why this 
should be the case. In this context, however, it is likely that plots on which one can build a tomb 
belong to the clan and cannot truly become private property, which decreases one’s incentives to 
invest in them. Because the Malagasy regularly organize two- to three-day extended family 
reunions called famadihana (turning of the bones) during which they take the bodies of the 
ancestors out of the family tomb and wrap them in fresh shrouds as part of the cult of the 
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ancestors (Graeber 1995), and because these ceremonies tend to be destructive to the soil around 
a tomb, it is not unlikely that landowners who expect to build tombs on their plots simply choose 
not make productivity-enhancing investments on the same plots. 
 
To investigate this result further, an alternative specification (not shown) of the productivity 
equation was estimated during preliminary work for this paper which was augmented with the 
interaction between the number of people over the age of 64 in the household and the dummy for 
whether the landowner had the right to build a tomb on the plot. In that alternative specification 
(i) the interaction between the number of elderly individuals within the household and the 
dummy for whether the landowner can build a tomb had negative impact on productivity which 
was significant at the 1 percent level; and (ii) the dummy for whether the landowner can build a 
tomb no longer had a significant impact on productivity. Given that life expectancy is a little 
under 63 years in Madagascar, this suggests that landowners who expect to have to build a tomb 
on their plot soon may be less likely to have recently made productivity-increasing investments 
on their plots. Lastly, looking at the FE columns of table 3 and 5, the impact of the right to build 
a tomb on agricultural productivity is the same, i.e., the right to build a tomb is associated with 
decreases in productivity. 
 
Likewise, that the right to lease a plot out decreases productivity is consistent with the empirical 
evidence associating land leases with a considerable amount of tenurial insecurity in Madagascar 
(Blanc-Pamard and Rakoto Ramiarantsoa 2000; Sandron 2008; Bellemare 2012). In this context, 
there are pronounced life-cycle effects, as land leases occur primarily between elderly landlords 
and young tenants, and over a third of the plots in Madagascar are under some form of land 
tenancy (Bellemare 2012). Thus, a landowner who has the right to lease her plot out will almost 
always do so in old age, so that the intention to lease a plot out is most likely indistinguishable 
from the right to do so in this context. As a consequence, a landowner may choose to underinvest 
in her plot’s productive capacity, or may have chosen to underinvest in her plot’s productive 
capacity in the past, if she knows she will be leasing it out in the future. 
 
This result deserves further investigation, especially since the right to lease out is related to other 
transfer rights, most notably the right to sell. Indeed, one would expect that all plots where the 
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right to sell exists, the right to lease also exists, but it isn’t necessarily so: though there are 394 
plots for which those rights are the same (i.e., the landowner can both sell the plot and lease it 
out or the landowner can neither sell the plot nor lease it out), there are 79 plots for which those 
rights differ (i.e., the landowner can either sell the plot or lease it out, but not both). Moreover, 
two different dummy variables were defined: a variable equal to one if the landowner perceives 
she has both the right to sell and the right to lease out and equal to zero otherwise, and a variable 
equal to one if the landowner perceives she has the right to lease out but not to sell. Controlling 
for unobserved heterogeneity by including household fixed effects shows that the coefficients on 
both those dummy variables are negative and statistically significant. The results (not shown) 
also suggest that the right to sell and the right to lease out are jointly associated with decreases in 
productivity, but the right to lease out, absent the right to sell, is associated with a larger decrease 
in productivity. 
 
Finally, that the right to plant trees is associated with increases in agricultural productivity in the 
FE specifications of tables 3 and 5 is not surprising, as landowners usually plant trees to prevent 
soil erosion or to improve soil fertility. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper has studied the effect of formal and informal land rights on agricultural productivity 
in rural Madagascar. As such, its main contribution has been to improve upon the identification 
of the effects of property rights, first by using precise soil quality measurements to control for 
the unobserved heterogeneity between plots, and then by attempting to separate reduced-form 
causal impacts of property rights on agricultural productivity. 
 
Following through with the results of the empirical specification which emerged as the preferred 
one after a series of statistical tests, while formal land rights (i.e., land titles) have no impact on 
agricultural productivity in this context, result suggests that there is a negative association 
between the right to lease out and agricultural productivity. This is presumably due to the 
considerable amount of tenurial insecurity that is associated with the land rental market in 
Madagascar (Bellemare 2012), although this is merely speculative given that the data do not 
allow exploring the mechanism by which the right to lease might decrease productivity. There is 
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also evidence that the right to build a tomb on the plot is associated with a decrease in 
productivity while the right to plant trees is associated with an increase in productivity. 
 
That formal land rights have no significant impact on productivity in this context echoes the 
conclusions of Atwood (1990) and Place (2009) for Africa as well as of Jacoby and Minten 
(2007) for Madagascar. Consistent with this, in his seminal study of state power in Africa, Herbst 
(2000, page 191) notes that 
 
“France was notable for its unusually unsuccessful efforts to disrupt customary tenure 
during the colonial period, despite its sweeping laws that theoretically made wholesale 
changes in land tenure (…) France relied on administrative fiat to try to change 
customary tenure procedures.” 
 
In other words, while land titling did reasonably well in replacing customary land tenure 
institutions in British colonies, they were much less effective in doing so in French colonies, and 
so it should perhaps come as no surprise that land titles play no special role in increasing 
agricultural productivity in the context of a French colony like Madagascar. This is consistent 
with Brasselle et al.’s (2002) findings for Burkina Faso, another French colony. Whether land 
rights are more effective in former British colonies than they are in former French colonies 
should be explored more carefully by future researchers given the current emphasis on 
institutions in economics (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). 
 
Although these results says nothing about the impact of land rights on productivity in a context 
where the legal system is effective, they do point to institutional failures at a level beyond that of 
the community, given that the results in this paper control for institutional differences between 
communities. Because many land titles have not been kept up to date, it is not surprising that 
land titles should have no impact on agricultural productivity in this context. Given data 
limitations, however, it remains impossible to test whether it is indeed institutional failures at a 
level beyond that of the community which drives the empirical result for formal land rights. As 
for informal land rights, one can only speculate as to the causal mechanisms through which these 
rights impact productivity given data limitations and, as such, the investigation of these causal 
mechanisms is left for future research. 
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In terms of policy implications, although the empirical results in this paper strongly suggest that 
land titles have no statistically significant impact on agricultural productivity in Madagascar, one 
should mistake a lack of statistical significance for a lack of economic significance. Indeed, the 
US government’s Millennium Challenge Corporation signed a $110 million, four-year compact 
with the government of Madagascar in 2005 which included an important land tenure 
component, and whose goal was to “increase land titling,” and thus land security (Millennium 
Challenge Corporation 2010). But in a context where land titles do not seem to have the improve 
agricultural productivity, the finding that land titles do not have such an impact is highly relevant 
for policy in that it helps knowing where to allocate aid dollars at the margin. Here, it looks as 
though aid might be better allocated to a reform of the legal framework within which agriculture 
takes place. Policy should be based on empirical evidence – not theoretical beliefs. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics (n=473) 
Variable Coefficient (Std. Dev.) 
Yield (Kg/Are) 37.427 (27.734) 
Cultivated Area (Ares) 16.433 (19.134) 
Soil Quality Measurements 
Carbon (Percent) 2.403 (1.079) 
Nitrogen (Percent) 0.213 (0.090) 
Soil pH 5.069 (0.306) 
Potassium (Percent) 0.206 (0.068) 
Clay (Percent) 28.210 (3.651) 
Silt (Percent) 26.409 (6.408) 
Sand (Percent 45.134 (8.034) 
Plot Characteristics 
Crop Disease Dummy 0.186 (0.390) 
Distance from House (Walking Minutes) 10.289 (10.774) 
Black Soil Dummy 0.505 (0.501) 
Red Soil Dummy 0.184 (0.388) 
Brown or White Soil Dummy 0.311 (0.463) 
Lowland Plot Dummy 0.619 (0.486) 
Hilltop Plot Dummy 0.027 (0.164) 
Hillside Plot Dummy 0.353 (0.478) 
Irrigated by Rain Dummy 0.152 (0.360) 
Irrigated by Dam Dummy 0.450 (0.498) 
Irrigated by Spring Dummy 0.372 (0.484) 
Land Rights 
Right to Sell Dummy 0.564 (0.496) 
Right to Build a Tomb Dummy 0.152 (0.360) 
Right to Lease Out Dummy 0.723 (0.448) 
Right to Plant Trees Dummy 0.516 (0.500) 
Kids Will Have the Same Rights Dummy 0.459 (0.499) 
Inherited Plot Dummy 0.643 (0.480) 
Purchased Plot Dummy 0.319 (0.467) 
Plot Received as Gift Dummy 0.006 (0.079) 
Plot Obtained Through Clearing Dummy 0.023 (0.151) 
Formal Title Dummy 0.323 (0.468) 
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Table 2. Selected Descriptive Statistics for Untitled vs. Titled Plots (n=473) 
  Untitled Plots (n=320) Titled Plots (n=153)   
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Mean (Std. Dev.) Difference 
Disaggregated Land Rights Measures 
Right to Sell Dummy 0.609 (0.489) 0.471 (0.501) *** 
Children Will Have Same Rights Dummy 0.397 (0.490) 0.588 (0.494) *** 
Right to Build a Tomb Dummy 0.181 (0.386) 0.092 (0.289) *** 
Right to Lease Out Dummy 0.719 (0.450) 0.732 (0.444) 
Right to Plant Trees Dummy 0.531 (0.500) 0.484 (0.501) 
Mode of Acquisition 
Inherited Plot Dummy 0.609 (0.489) 0.712 (0.454) ** 
Purchased Plot Dummy 0.356 (0.480) 0.242 (0.430) *** 
Plot Received as Gift Dummy 0.000 (0.000) 0.020 (0.139) ** 
Plot Obtained Through Clearing Dummy 0.022 (0.147) 0.026 (0.160)   
Soil Quality Measurements 
Carbon (Percent) 2.279 (0.055) 2.663 (0.098) *** 
Nitrogen (Percent) 0.205 (0.005) 0.231 (0.008) *** 
Soil pH 5.114 (0.018) 4.976 (0.020) *** 
Potassium (Percent) 0.213 (0.004) 0.190 (0.005) *** 
Clay (Percent) 28.432 (0.201) 27.745 (0.301) ** 
Silt (Percent) 26.536 (0.361) 26.143 (0.511) 
Sand (Percent) 44.797 (0.463) 45.840 (0.603) * 
Rice Yield 
Mean 38.523 (1.661) 35.136 (1.858) 
Note: The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. 
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Table 3. Agricultural Productivity of Formal and Informal Land Rights  
  OLS IV FE FE-IV 
  Coefficient   (Std. Err.) Coefficient   (Std. Err.) Coefficient   (Std. Err.) Coefficient   (Std. Err.) 
Formal Title -0.018 (0.072) -0.306 (0.686) -0.138 (0.175) 0.434 (0.712) 
Right to Sell -0.057 (0.083) -0.117 (0.136) 0.076 (0.283) 0.184 (0.237) 
Right to Lease Out 0.191 ** (0.082) 0.247 (0.151) -0.713 ** (0.319) -0.550 (0.354) 
Rights of Children Identical 0.006 (0.077) 0.060 (0.159) 0.144 (0.304) 0.213 (0.364) 
Right to Plant Trees -0.032 (0.091) -0.022 (0.091) 0.784 * (0.445) 0.521 (0.492) 
Right to Build a Tomb 0.054 (0.164) 0.028 (0.186) -0.818 * (0.447) -0.709 ** (0.343) 
Log of Plot Size -0.346 *** (0.030) -0.343 *** (0.031) -0.213 *** (0.069) -0.225 *** (0.054) 
Crop Disease -0.088 (0.104) -0.083 (0.103) -0.092 (0.150) -0.040 (0.146) 
Distance from House -0.003 (0.002) -0.002 (0.002) -0.004 (0.007) -0.004 (0.006) 
Red Soil -0.183 (0.118) -0.186 (0.111) -0.001 (0.206) 0.042 (0.152) 
Brown or White Soil -0.062 (0.083) -0.075 (0.082) 0.256 * (0.142) 0.221 (0.122) 
Hilltop Plot -0.206 (0.245) -0.142 (0.347) -0.428 (0.353) -0.486 (0.330) 
Hillside Plot -0.117 * (0.069) -0.127 * (0.072) -0.184 (0.163) -0.172 (0.115) 
Irrigated by Dam 0.180 ** (0.076) 0.176 ** (0.081) 0.305 * (0.183) 0.434 * (0.224) 
Irrigated by Spring 0.184 *** (0.071) 0.179 ** (0.072) 0.330 (0.204) 0.437 ** (0.210) 
Carbon -0.683 (0.862) -0.340 (0.898) -0.292 (3.122) 0.052 (1.627) 
Nitrogen 0.954 (0.992) 0.593 (0.994) 0.143 (3.178) -0.173 (2.251) 
Soil pH -0.136 (1.431) -0.552 (1.056) -28.728 ** (13.900) -23.790 (15.787) 
Potassium 0.208 (0.283) 0.185 (0.202) -7.854 ** (3.193) -7.659 ** (3.265) 
Clay 0.198 (2.473) -0.395 (2.715) -4.215 (4.663) -5.186 (4.195) 
Silt -0.666 (1.894) -1.031 (1.469) 12.342 (13.122) 7.583 (15.184) 
Sand -0.578 (3.206) -1.313 (2.876) 11.514 (9.149) 9.878 (7.295) 
Intercept 4.061 *** (0.117) 4.120 *** (0.154) 3.823 *** (1.158) 3.433 *** (0.582) 
Number of Observations 473 473 473 473 
Household Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes 
Bootstrap Replications 500 - 500 - 
F-statistic (Instrument) - 2.89 - 9.61 
p-value (All Coefficients) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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p-value (Soil Quality) 0.97 0.05 0.02 0.02 
R2 0.38 0.35 0.97 0.97 
Note: The symbols ***, **, and * respectively denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. The F-statistic is used to assess whether the instrumental variable is 
weak (Stock and Yogo 2002). The two p-values respectively refer to a test of the null hypothesis that all coefficients are equal to zero, and a test of the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients on the soil quality measurement variables are equal to zero. 
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Table 4. Agricultural Productivity Impacts of Formal Land Rights (n=473) 
Specification 
Soil  
Quality 
Informal Land 
Rights 
Coefficient 
on Land Title 
Block 1: Soil Quality and Informal Land Rights Both Excluded as Regressors 
OLS No No -0.035 
IV No No -0.484 
FE No No 0.028 
FE-IV No No 0.420 
Block 2: Soil Quality Included, Informal Land Rights Excluded as Regressors 
OLS Yes No -0.009 
IV Yes No -0.553 
FE Yes No 0.001 
FE-IV Yes No 0.282 
Block 3: Soil Quality Excluded, Informal Land Rights Included as Regressors 
OLS No Yes -0.044 
IV No Yes -.0345 
FE No Yes -0.104 
FE-IV No Yes 0.666 
Block 4: Soil Quality and Informal Land Rights Both Included as Regressors 
OLS Yes Yes -0.018 
IV Yes Yes -0.306 
FE Yes Yes -0.138 
FE-IV Yes Yes 0.434 
Note: The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 
percent levels. Each block represents a set of specification which include or exclude the 
soil quality measurements (i.e., the ln s variables in equations 1 to 4) and which include 
or exclude the informal land rights measures (i.e., the r variables in equations 1 to 4). 
Each line within a block respectively corresponds to the specifications in equations 1 to 4 
(i.e., OLS, IV, FE, and FE-IV). The last column presents the estimated impact of a formal 
land title on agricultural productivity for each specification. In no case is that estimated 
impact statistically significant. A full set of results is available from the author. 
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Table 5. Agricultural Productivity Impacts of Informal Land Rights 
  OLS FE OLS FE 
  Coefficient   (Std. Err.) Coefficient   (Std. Err.) Coefficient   (Std. Err.) Coefficient   (Std. Err.) 
Right to Sell -0.037 (0.082) 0.116 (0.256) -0.054 (0.077) 0.102 (0.267) 
Right to Lease Out 0.164 ** (0.075) -0.714 ** (0.319) 0.188 ** (0.080) -0.674 ** (0.313) 
Rights of Children Identical -0.003 (0.058) 0.153 (0.209) 0.003 (0.072) 0.161 (0.319) 
Right to Plant Trees -0.032 (0.091) 0.719 ** (0.360) -0.032 (0.090) 0.721 * (0.432) 
Right to Build a Tomb 0.031 (0.173) -0.569 (0.375) 0.055 (0.163) -0.792 * (0.435) 
Log of Plot Size -0.347 *** (0.029) -0.222 *** (0.070) -0.347 *** (0.030) -0.216 *** (0.067) 
Crop Disease -0.088 (0.097) -0.040 (0.175) -0.089 (0.103) -0.079 (0.150) 
Distance from House -0.004 (0.002) -0.005 (0.005) -0.003 (0.002) -0.004 (0.007) 
Red Soil -0.126 (0.123) -0.045 (0.237) -0.183 (0.118) 0.009 (0.207) 
Brown or White Soil -0.025 (0.079) 0.161 (0.190) -0.061 (0.083) 0.248 * (0.140) 
Hilltop Plot -0.194 (0.241) -0.151 (0.309) -0.210 (0.241) -0.442 (0.352) 
Hillside Plot -0.119 * (0.063) -0.104 (0.179) -0.116 * (0.069) -0.181 (0.162) 
Irrigated by Dam 0.211 *** (0.066) 0.254 (0.188) 0.180 ** (0.076) 0.336 * (0.192) 
Irrigated by Spring 0.197 *** (0.073) 0.294 (0.207) 0.184 ** (0.072) 0.356 * (0.212) 
Carbon -0.704 (0.853) -0.209 (3.065) 
Nitrogen 0.977 (0.980) 0.067 (3.141) 
Soil pH -0.110 (1.452) -27.536 ** (13.598) 
Potassium 0.210 (0.280) -7.807 ** (3.181) 
Clay 0.234 (2.421) -4.449 (4.595) 
Silt -0.644 (1.884) 11.194 (13.049) 
Sand -0.533 (3.175) 11.119 (8.869) 
Intercept 4.041 *** (0.107) 3.814 *** (0.359) 4.057 *** (0.119) 3.729 *** (1.152) 
Number of Observations 473 473 473 473 
Household Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes 
Bootstrap Replications - - 500 500 
p-value (All Coefficients) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
p-value (Soil Quality) - - 0.97 0.01 
R2 0.36 0.97 0.38 0.97 
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Note: The symbols ***, **, and * respectively denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. The two p-values respectively refer to a test of the null hypothesis 
that all coefficients are equal to zero, and a test of the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the soil quality measurement variables are equal to zero. 
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Table A1. Soil Quality Measurement Imputation Regressions (n=234) 
Variable Carbon Nitrogen Potassium pH Clay Silt Sand 
Principal Component 1 -21.866 -1.61 -0.809 77.237 -17.844 0.411 -62.696 
(3.630) (0.308) (0.708) (27.731) (34.451) (1.809) (40.802) 
Principal Component 2 34.244 3.2 -0.058 -147.601 92.245 12.092 55.525 
  (6.167) (0.523) (1.218) (47.572) (59.100) (3.103) (69.996) 
Number of Soil Samples 234 234 234 234 234 234 234 
Village Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.88 0.89 0.57 0.94 0.90 0.99 0.37 
Note: Reproduced from Barrett et al. (2010). Standard errors are in parentheses. The results of these regressions are used to impute the values of the dependent 
variables (i.e., carbon, nitrogen, potassium, pH, clay, silt, and sand) for the entire sample of 473 plots. Each column regresses a soil quality measurement 
obtained by wet chemistry on the principal components obtained from spectral analysis. The estimated coefficients are then used to predict each dependent 
variable for the whole sample. 
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1
 Using data from Paraguay, Carter and Olinto (2003) disentangle the investment-demand and credit-supply effects 
of property rights reform and find that if the credit supply effect does not manage to relax credit constraints, 
landowners will substitute investment in fixed assets for investment in current (i.e., expropriation-immune) assets, 
with the result that the benefits of property rights reform largely accrue to wealthier landowners, who are less likely 
to be credit constrained. Likewise, Besley and Ghatak (2009) show that depending on the degree of competition in 
the credit market, it is in theory possible for some borrowers to be made worse off by property rights reform. Testing 
the theoretical frameworks developed in either Carter and Olinto (2003) or Besley and Ghatak (2009) is well beyond 
the scope of the data used in this paper. 
2
 See also Fenske (2010) for a study of incomplete property rights in Côte d’Ivoire. The survey questionnaire used 
here, however, failed to ask respondents about the origins of these subjective perceptions. See Delavande et al. 
(2010) for an overview of the literature on subjective perceptions in development economics. 
3
 Specifically, the estimation sample consists of 473 plots belonging to 290 households and there are 132 households 
who own more than one plot. 
4
 While the data used by Goldstein and Udry (2008) include measures of soil pH and organic matter, the focus of 
their paper is on the relationship between the property rights and political power of landowners. 
5
 Although precise measures of soil quality are observed here, they are typically unobservable. In a slight abuse of 
language, the remainder of this paper will refer to them as “unobservable” even though they are observed in this 
context.  
6
 Most of the information in this section is discussed extensively in an edited volume by Sandron (2008). 
7
 Although this number may seem low, it has emerged as a consensus about the number of titles emitted annually 
between the participants of the aforementioned workshop on land tenure organized by the Ministry of Agriculture in 
early 2005. A 2010 audit of the administration of land tenure in Madagascar reports that only 1,500 new titles are 
delivered annually. See page 22 of the audit report at http://www.notariat-francophone.org/wp-
content/uploads/2010/10/rappor_mada_version_9_septembre-2010.pdf. 
8
 Both the bankruptcy of the formal titling system and the emergence of the petits papiers system in Madagascar 
offer evidence against the evolutionary theory of land rights, a critique of which can be found in Platteau (1996). 
9
 Because households do not move from one village to the other within the cross-sectional data used in this paper, 
these fixed effects also account for the heterogeneity of customary rights and institutions at the level of the 
community (i.e., the unobserved heterogeneity between villages). 
10
 In contrast with Burkina Faso, where different individuals within a household own different plots (Udry 1996), in 
Madagascar the household head owns all the household’s plots. 
11
 A similar reasoning applies to informal land rights. 
12
 Because the soil quality data were given to the author as is, it was not possible to bootstrap the entire procedure 
(i.e., the imputation of soil quality measurements and the estimation of equations 1 to 6). Thus, only the standard 
errors of the estimated equations themselves were bootstrapped. 
13
 One hectare is equal to 100 ares, and one are is equal to 100 square meters. 
14
 Given that distilled water has a (neutral) pH of 7, this denotes a relatively high level of soil acidity in the sample. 
15
 It may seem puzzling that one can build tomb on lowland rice plots, which are flooded. A plot’s cultivated area is 
smaller than a plot’s total area, however, so that if one were to build a tomb on a lowland rice plot, the tomb would 
be built on the dry edge of the plot, or the plot would be drained so as to accommodate a tomb. 
16
 It is unfortunately impossible to tell whether the titles belong to the respondents or to their family members, in 
which case the instrumental variables approach used in this paper would be invalid. For this reason, the IV and FE-
IV results are presented purely for comparison with previous studies, and the empirical results in this paper include 
specifications both with and without the instrumental variable. 
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17
 Such a figure might seem high in a context where the emission of new land titles is as slow as discussed in this 
paper. There was a large number of land titles emitted, however, when Madagascar’s land tenure institution were 
founded upon the country’s independence in 1960. 
18
 At the time of the survey, US$1 ≈ 300 Ariary. 
19
 One should be careful not to give soil quality measurements a structural interpretation. These variables are 
included here as control variables. Ideally, one would include each soil quality measurement along with its square 
and its interactions with other inputs. Given the sample size, however, it was not possible to do so in this case. Thus, 
although one would expect a nonlinear structural relationship between yield and soil pH (Federico 2005), for 
instance, this variable enters equations 1 to 4 only linearly because of the role of soil pH as a control variable. To 
ensure that the results for land rights are robust to nonlinearities in soil quality, however, robustness checks (not 
shown) were conducted in which the soil quality measurements entered nonlinearly (i.e., the squared logarithm of 
each soil quality measurement was used as regressor instead of the logarithm of each soil quality measurement), but 
this did not change the qualitative results in tables 3 and 4. 
20
 The effect of formal land rights (i.e., whether a plot is titled) on soil quality controls were estimated during 
preliminary empirical work. These results are not shown but are available from the author. In only one case (an FE-
IV specification regressing the percentage of potassium in the soil on a dummy for whether the plot is titled and on 
controls plot characteristics) was the effect of formal land rights significant. Even in that case, the effect was barely 
significant at the 10 percent level. 
21
 For instance Stifel et al. (2011) find that the number of days for which agricultural work is prohibited has a 
negative impact on agricultural productivity. 
